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Central Asia after Fifteen Years of Transition:
Growth, Regional Cooperation, and Policy Choices
I. Introduction
The decline of socialist countries after the former Soviet Union has been well documented.1 The literature is 
extensive with good surveys provided by Fischer and Sahay (2000), Campos and Coricelli (2002), and Svejnar 
(2002). Much of the literature has focused on the transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, 
South Eastern Europe, and Russia within the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, an important 
group—the Central Asian Republics (CARs)—have traditionally received less interest.2 Strategically located and 
land-locked between Europe and Asia, they have had rich and varied experiences implementing policy reforms 
over the past 15 years. With large endowments of minerals and other commodities, they have also become a 
growing focus of international attention, particularly given the increasing demand for raw materials in rapidly 
growing economies, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India. 
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, the length and depth of the transition recession in former Soviet economies was 
unexpected by early observers.3 Initial estimates were that the power of market forces and the efﬁciency gains of 
competition, along with better allocation of resources, would more than compensate for adjustments in moving 
from centralized planning to a market economy (see, for example, Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Balcerowitz, 1994; 
Sachs 1996). These observers suggested that a “big bang” (or shock therapy) approach would rapidly bring 
about the transition and that economic prosperity would be higher than during Soviet times. 
This  optimism  was  obviously  misplaced,  as  most  countries  went  into  a  period  of  sharp  contraction  in  the 
early 1990s. A series of stylized facts has been proposed to explain this decline. These include (i) tight credit 
policies; (ii) a collapse in credit—as subsidies to ﬁrms were reduced; (iii) an increase in real interest rates; (iv) 
a general disorganization within the economy—as centrally planned (speciﬁed) producers and distributors had 
to be replaced by less specialized ﬁrms and suppliers; (v) the development of new business habits among both 
producers and consumers ; (vi) major adjustments in the labor market; and (vi) the dissolution of the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance—governing trade among Soviet bloc members (see Svejnar, 2002, Campos and 
Coricelli, 2002, Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
While these stylized facts developed, there was extensive discussion on the merits of either big bang or gradual 
reform policies. Within this debate, various kinds of policy reforms were bandied about, deemed necessary for 
a more rapid and efﬁcient transition based on economic performance. There is some consensus that big bang 
reforms are too simplistic, and that a more complex approach is needed to ensure effective transition to a market 
economy. Observers have developed two categories of policies to reﬂect this complexity: Type I policies include 
standard big bang instruments such as macro, price, and exchange rate reforms, and Type II policies that include 
regulatory, legal, and other institutional reforms. Additional policy instruments may also be required to reﬂect the 
special land-locked circumstances of the CARs. 
This paper aims to present a coherent and systematic analysis of the collapse and subsequent revival of the 
CARs during the 1990–2005 period. Six economies are examined: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The focus is on the pattern of economic growth, its causes, and the 
1These countries include: Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, South Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. See EBRD (2005) for the details of these groupings.
2 Some notable exceptions include the papers in Rumer (ed. 1996, ed. 2000, and ed. 2002) and Burghart and Sabonis-Helf (ed. 2004). 
See also Pomfret (2000 and 2003a), Starr (2004), Hausmann and Others (2005), and UNDP (2005).
3 Fisher and Sahay (2000) thus note: “A decade ago it was generally expected that output would fall at the start of the reform process, as a 
result of both macroeconomic stabilization and the reallocation of resources from unproductive to sectors that would be proﬁtable at world 
prices. …although the extent to which output collapsed far exceeded expectations. By the time output had bottomed out, it had fallen by 
more than 40 per cent on average” (Fisher and Sahey, 2000, p. 4). 2
4 See the classic study by Chenery, Syrquin, and Robinson (1986). For a comprehensive survey of recent studies on growth see Durlauf 
and Quah (1999).
associated transformations in economic structure during the cycle of decline and subsequent revival, which 
has been inadequately analyzed in the literature to date. This paper relates economic performance to initial 
conditions, country characteristics, and economic policies. And within this framework, it proposes a simple 
typology of policies (including a new “Type III”) and assesses them against the cycle of decline and revival. It 
also examines medium-term economic prospects and policy needs. 








Share of World 
Reserves Geography Reform Status
Oil Gas
Oil Exporters
   Azerbaijan 1,029.4 8.3 0.6 0.8 Landlocked Active
   Kazakhstan 2,723.9 15.0 3.3 1.7 Landlocked Active
   Turkmenistan 1,250.7 6.2 0.042 1.6 Landlocked No reforms
Non-oil Exporters
   Kyrgyz Republic 432.4 5.1 Landlocked Active
   Tajikistan 323.1 6.7 Landlocked Active
   Uzbekistan1 461.2 26.0 0.05* 1.0
Double 
landlocked2 Partially active
1Uzbekistan has small oil reserves and signiﬁcant natural gas reserves but does not export except to neighboring countries.
2Goods from Uzbekistan must pass two borders to reach seaports. 
Sources: British Petroleum (2005), ADB Key Indicators 2005, World Bank World Development Indicators 2006; authors’ estimates.
II. Typology of Policies
The literature on economic adjustment in developing and transition economies suggests that the pattern of long-
run growth and structural change is a function of many factors. These include initial conditions, country size, 
geographical location, investment, human capital, technological progress and, above all, economic policies.4 
Based on the complexity of the various transitions, analysts typically distinguish between Type I and Type II 
policies (World Bank, 2002; Svejnar, 2002). Table 2 provides a policy matrix with examples of each, including the 
new “Type III” typology.3
Table 2: Typology of Economic Policies during Transition
Policy 
Type
Focus of Policy Results
Type I Macroeconomic—inﬂation, monetary 
and ﬁscal policies, and exchange rate 
policy
Microeconomic—labor market 
and wages, social safety nets, price 
liberalization (exceptions for energy, 
staple food, and housing) and removal 
of subsidies 
Banking and State-owned 
Enterprises—reduced subsidies, 
privatization, and bank liberalization.
 
These reforms did not achieve the anticipated increase 
in productivity in the CARs. One reason was that 
governments were unable to quickly create revenue 
ﬂows to ﬁnance even recurrent expenditures, particularly 
those tied to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As a result, 
there was a hesitation to replace inefﬁcient SOEs with 
more efﬁcient private enterprises, as removing subsidies 
frequently led to the failure of these SOEs. Banking 
reforms were successful in allowing entry although state 
banks, which retained their inﬂuence in many CARs. 
Social beneﬁt systems were inadequate given limited 
resources. This overall situation did not improve until the 
late 1990s. 
Type II Primarily legal policies:
•  Developing legal and regulatory 
frameworks for industry and 
ﬁnance 
•  Privatization of medium- and 
large- scale enterprises—sale 
of assets to employees or 
independent  parties
•  Restructuring the labor 
market—wage determination, 
unemployment compensation, and 
retirement beneﬁts
Withstanding pressures from special interest groups was 
the main obstacle governments faced in trying to build 
a level playing ﬁeld attractive to foreign investors. In the 
oil exporting CARs, for example, these policies proved 
successful in providing a reliable environment to attract 
foreign dire4ct investment. For non-oil exporters, these 
reforms were less successful. Privatization did not bring 
expected beneﬁts and special interest groups were able to 
inﬂuence policy. 
Type III Regional cooperation—within the 
CARs using various initiatives such as 
trade facilitation, transport, and energy 
policy dialogue and cooperation.
Develop industrial competitiveness 
policies— to foster diversiﬁcation away 
from natural resources and other raw 
material production into manufacturing. 
These policies were slow to develop, particularly in 
the ﬁrst half of the 1990s when the CARs were more 
concerned with developing national identities and earning 
revenue through customs taxation. Recent developments, 
however, suggest a greater willingness to lower tariffs 
and cooperate on both transport and energy policies. To 
foster economic diversiﬁcation, Kazakhstan introduced an 
innovative industrial development strategy in 2003, which 
contains elements of an industrial competitiveness policy 
agenda such as fostering industrial clusters. Azerbaijan 
is also assessing its industrial competitiveness and may 
follow suit. 
 
Big bang policies of Type I are standard macro, price, and exchange rate reforms and are components of 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs of international ﬁnancial institutions (Lipton and Sachs, 1990; 
Balcerowitz, 1994; Sachs 1996). These are macro stabilization and inﬂation policies focusing on monetary and 
ﬁscal issues, trade reforms, as well as policies aimed at dismantling the command and control institutional 
structure of the former Soviet system. These policies also include microeconomic reforms designed to address 
price distortions that constrain market efﬁciency, such as more efﬁcient resource allocation, replacing subsidies 
with market-determined prices, breaking up or rationalizing SOEs, and allowing markets to use production factors 
efﬁciently. Sometimes included are reforms of state-owned banks and the establishment of social safety nets 
to deal with the unemployment created by reallocation of resources during the transition. Type I reforms are 
sometimes also referred to as “ﬁrst generation” reforms. 4
5 A similar magnitude of economic collapse is reported by other studies. Using national GDP data, Zhukov (2002) ﬁnds that real GDP in 
1990–1995 fell by 58% in Tajikistan, 49% in the Kyrgyz Republic, 39% in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and 19% in Uzbekistan. 
6 For example, see Campos and Coricelli (2002) and World Bank (2002).
Type II category reforms primarily deal with the development of legal and regulatory frameworks for both public 
and private sectors. Often focusing on productive sectors—i.e., industry, agriculture, and the services— details 
may vary but include revisions of laws affecting the private sector, a reduction in bureaucratic red tape for 
establishing small businesses, building transparency in public enterprises, and creating procedures for the 
privatization and development of regulations governing institutions. These reforms are sometimes referred to as 
“second-generation” reforms, implying that they are implemented once Type I policies are in place.  
Type III policies add two sets of initiatives that have particular pertinence to the land-locked CARs: (i) regional 
cooperation and (ii) industrial competitiveness. With small domestic markets, ,the land-locked CARs are isolated 
from international markets and thus unable to reap economies of scale. They also face high transport and transit 
costs, and are therefore relatively unattractive to foreign direct investment (except in oil and gas). Using regional 
initiatives in key areas—notably in transport, trade, and energy—can not only link the CARs with each other, but 
help link them to international markets (UNDP, 2005). Examples of these initiatives in the CARs would include 
road, rail and air transport system integration; harmonization of border posts and customs procedures, and the 
development of an efﬁcient regional energy market. Region-wide free trade agreements (to reduce trade barriers) 
and monetary and ﬁnancial cooperation (including policy dialogue and surveillance, bond market development, 
and open exchange rate policies) could also be added (Lamberte, 2005). 
To be effective, regional cooperation initiatives in the CARs need to be underpinned by policies to improve 
industrial  competitiveness—to  support  the  often  difﬁcult  process  each  ﬁrm  faces  in  building  technological 
compatibility required to cost-effectively compete in export markets. The experience of more advanced developing 
and transition economies show that the building capabilities at the ﬁrm-level requires conscious investment in 
information search, engineering, training, and research and development to translate imported technologies into 
productive use (Lall, 1992; Nelson and Pack, 1999). Missing factor markets and weak institutional support (for 
technology, skills, ﬁnance, and export marketing) constrain ﬁrms from building better production capabilities. 
Changing market and institutional imperfections into greater competitiveness can be addressed by introducing 
market-friendly  measures  such  as  increasing  imports  of  technology  (e.g.,  foreign  investments,  technology 
licensing, and consultants); adopting international best practices and standards for quality management of small 
and medium enterprises; upgrading technology-based institutions; improving access to industrial ﬁnance for 
technological development; and strengthening production linkages between small and large ﬁrms along the 
supply chain and within industrial clusters (Lall and Teubal, 1998; Wignaraja, 2003). 
Applying any of the Type I, II, or III policies alone would result in partial transitional economic success. However, 
taken together they present an interlocking set of complementary policies that are much more likely to succeed. 
We will return to these policies throughout the paper. The introduction and speed of implementation has a direct 
bearing on both the collapse of the CAR economies in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, as well as their subsequent 
revival later on.   
III. Collapse
All of the CARs suffered severe reductions in real output following the breakup of the Soviet Union (Figure 1). 
Between 1990 and 1996, real output fell by between 40% and 60% in all the CARs with the exception of 
Uzbekistan, where real output fell less than 20%.5 Aside from reasons common to all the transition economies,6 
there are several features of the collapse particular to the CARs, some of which are related to their previous 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online. 
During the Soviet period, the CARs were required to supply raw materials, energy, and intermediate inputs to 
Russia as part of the integrated production system. Russia supplied ﬁnished manufactured goods to the CARS 
and other regions (IMF and Others, 1991). This naturally constrained the ﬂexibility of the industrial sector during 
the transition. To compound matters, SOEs in the CARs had been under Russian management, thus, there 
were few qualiﬁed local managers able to take over during the transition. Private manufacturing was prohibited 
during Soviet times so there was no private sector apart from informal trade. Furthermore, international trade 
was handled directly from Moscow or through Russian SOEs. As a result there were virtually no opportunities to 
develop marketing relationships with foreign buyers or investors during the early transition period. 
In addition, all of the CARs were dependent on Soviet subsidies to industries, and when those were suspended, 
it added signiﬁcant ﬁscal pressure. This made maintaining social safety nets more difﬁcult as budgets were 
stretched and thus poverty increased rapidly. There was also a breakdown in the supply of raw materials and 
other inputs during the early stages of transition. This further exacerbated proﬁtability and affected operations of 
a variety of SOEs, as well as newly privatized industries. 
In terms of geography, all of the CARs are landlocked. Sea access for traded goods is through the Russian 
Federation or Iran. Uzbekistan is double landlocked—meaning goods have to pass two borders to reach the 
sea. There are also other geographic barriers, including harsh winters and high mountains in Tajikistan and 
semi-arid conditions throughout much of the region. This climate and geography mean high costs for transport, 
communications, energy, and transit as well as extended delivery times to international markets (see Raballand, 
Kunth, and Auty, 2005; UNDP, 2005).7 Early on, this remoteness meant that industries had limited access to 
information or technology through contacts with overseas buyers and markets. 
7 UNDP (2005) suggest that there is an asymmetry in transport costs for shipments between Central Asia and Europe. Data provided by 
the study shows it costs $8,500–$10,000 to ship a truckload of cargo from the Benelux countries to Central Asia and only $6,000–$7,000 
to ship in the opposite direction. In an “ideal world”, shipments would cost $5,000–$6,000 in either direction.
Figure 1: Changes In Real GDP Index, 1990–2004 
(1990=100)6
Finally, the CARS are richly endowed with commodities such as crude oil, natural gas, cotton, gold, copper, 
aluminum, and iron. Three CARS (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) export natural gas and oil to 
international markets, while the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan export gold (see Table 1).8 These commodity 
exports account for from 30% to 88% of total exports, depending on the country (see Freinkman, Polyakov, and 
Revenco, 2004). Commodities also contribute heavily to ﬁscal revenues and provide resources for investment 
in development. During the Soviet period, these resources were distributed and marketed through Moscow 
(see Sabonis-Helf, 2004). In the early years of the transition, these transit links were severely disrupted. Soviet 
agencies such as Gazprom—which market oil and natural gas products—took advantage of their monopolies 
over distribution to price commodities below market levels. The result was a drop in commodity exports with and 
associated drop in government revenue throughout the CARs. 
The collapse affected each CAR differently:9 
Kazakhstan is the largest country geographically (2.7 million square kilometers—the size of India) and has a 
wealth of natural resources. It now produces over a billion barrels of oil a year, almost as much as Indonesia 
(British Petroleum, 2005). The collapse in output was largely the result of the interruption of oil and natural gas 
production and exports, loss of subsidies from the Soviet Union, and the exit of skilled Russian technicians, 
scientists, and managers. The beginning of a manufacturing sector related to minerals production was also 
inhibited by lack of revenue, weak domestic investment, and failure to attract foreign direct investment. Poor 
ﬁscal performance meant that the government was unable to maintain infrastructure spending, and as a result, 
public investment and the provision of social services suffered. 
The other two oil and natural gas producing CARs—Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan—suffered similar disruptions. 
However, they were smaller economies and more dependent on Soviet markets and subsidies. As a result, 
the disruptions in supply of oil and natural gas were somewhat more serious than in the case of Kazakhstan. 
Furthermore, Azerbaijan was adversely affected during its conﬂict with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-
Karabakh  region—lasting  from  1988  until  the  1994  ceaseﬁre—which  claimed  30,000  lives,  created  about 
half a million Azeri refugees from Armenia into Azerbaijan, and resulted in widespread damage to physical 
infrastructure in both countries. 
While Uzbekistan exports gold, it relied more on agricultural production than the other CARs. Population densities 
were higher with its 26 million people close to 40% of the total population of the CARs. With import substitution 
and state-ownership the rule—rather than export promotion or private sector production—Uzbekistan adopted 
a cautious approach to economic reform. While there were disruptions in gold marketing, Uzbekistan suffered 
the smallest decline in production and income among the CARs. It also beneﬁted early on from buoyant world 
prices for cotton, its main export. In addition, some agricultural reforms occurred as collective farms were 
gradually converted to private ownership. However, the increase in productivity was small and recovery to pre-
transition levels of income in agriculture has been slow. 
With limited natural resources and small domestic markets, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic were even more 
closely tied to Moscow than the other CARs, through supply chains in manufacturing and from gold mining in 
the Kyrgyz Republic (see IMF and Others, 1991; Zhukov, 2000). As a result, the collapse in these two CARs 
followed closely the decline in Russian Federation’s economy (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, Tajikistan production 
fell much further and recovered more slowly than the other CARs, partly due to the civil war that erupted shortly 
after independence in 1991 and lasted until 1997. World Bank estimates suggest that the war killed 50,000 and 
caused $7 billion in physical damage (World Bank 2005). Tajikistan also had relatively higher levels of poverty, 
lower levels of education, and poorer quality infrastructure than other CARs.  
8 Uzbekistan is recognized to have signiﬁcant natural gas reserves and small oil reserves. However, it has witnessed modest gas 
production growth by avoiding Russia’s pipeline system and by concentrating on the domestic markets and on exports to its immediate 
neighbors. See British Petroleum (2005).
9 A useful distinction can be made between the oil and gas exporting CARs and non-oil and gas exporting CARs. For further explanations 
see the papers in Rumer (ed. 1996) as well as Fisher and Sahey (2000), Trushin and Trushin (2000), Zhukov (2000), Pomfret (2003a), 
Linn (2004), and Loukoianova and Unigovskaya (2004).7
Aside from the dominant role of mineral production—with sales and marketing done outside the region during 
the Soviet period, there were other reasons for the poor performance of the CARs in the early 1990s. Generally, 
enterprise restructuring was not as successful as in other transition economies such as Eastern Europe (for 
example, see the literature cited in Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Privatization did not positively affect output or 
productivity. New owners were not as effective as they were in Eastern Europe, in part because ownership was 
often transferred to workers who were not efﬁcient managers. Lack of Type II policies relating to governance issues 
such as the legal framework and operational transparency probably contributed to the poor performance. 
The lack of non-Russian markets played an important role in the length of the collapse. It took time to build 
relations with foreign ﬁrms outside Russia and to attract foreign investment for increasing production capacity 
in natural resources. Transport bottlenecks and transfer taxes with Russia and within the CARs themselves 
increased costs and reduced the attractiveness for both domestic and foreign investors. Also, technical capacity 
was reduced as many Russian technicians returned home. 
Four of the CARs (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan) attempted to implement economic 
reform programs in the 1990s, including both Type I and Type II policies. The timing of these programs, coverage, 
and implementation speed and success varied among countries. There is general agreement that the effectiveness 
of Type I and Type II policies during the collapse were compromised by the size of the adjustments required, the 
extent of disruptions in production and trade linkages, the lack of a core private sector to build on, inefﬁciency 
and technological obsolescence of SOEs, a virtual absence of markets or regulatory institutions, and widespread 
rent-seeking (for recent studies see Trushin and Trushin, 2000 and 2002; Zhukov, 2002; Pomfret, 2003a). In 
contrast with the four reform-minded CARs, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan maintained largely unchanged Soviet-
era economic policies during 1990–1996 (Wall, 2003; Sabonis-Helf, 2004). 
IV. Revival
Economic Growth
To analysis the CAR growth revival we should revisit Figure 1 to examine some interesting comparisons. Most 
obvious is that CAR trends are very similar to the Russian Federation (Russia). Early on, some observers called 
it an L shaped pattern—a relatively steep decline evening out over the ﬁrst ﬁve to nine years (Boeri and Terrell, 
2002). However, if we look at the entire 15 year period covered, it is far more a U-shaped curve bottoming out 
between 1995 and 1997 for the CARs and Russia (although Russia’s ﬁnancial crisis led to another decline in 
1998). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are exceptions, as Uzbekistan had a much milder decline to begin with, 
and Turkmenistan’s growth accelerated quite dramatically from 1997. Uzbekistan’s production returned to 1990 
levels of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001, Turkmenistan in 2002, and Kazakhstan in 2004. By 2004, 
Azerbaijan’s real GDP was 88.5% of its 1990 level, Kyrgyz Republic’s was 80.4%, and Tajikistan’s was 55.8%. 
In contrast, the best performers in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States had a very mild downturn. 
By 1993 or 1994, they had recovered to precrisis GDP levels as a result of (i) a higher initial level of development, 
(ii) inﬂows of FDI, (iii) proximity to Western European markets, (iv) implementation of appropriate stabilization 
and other early policy reforms (see World Bank, 2002; EBRD, 2005; Simoneti et al, 2005). The revival in the 
CARs can be similarly viewed from several perspectives. 
There are ﬁve basic reasons for the CARs revival—(i) higher international commodity prices and their impact 
on investment, ﬁscal performance, income, and consumption; (ii) an acceleration in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inﬂows, particularly in oil and gas, and in manufacturing to a lesser extent; (iii) better macroeconomic 
management; (iv) an upturn in agriculture due to good weather, high world commodity prices, and several 
agricultural reforms; and (v) improved political stability.10  
10 On the economic revival in Central Asia see also Rumer (2002), Starr (2004), Dowling and Wignaraja (2005), and International Monetary 
Fund (2005).8
Commodity Prices
After remaining relatively stable through the late 1990s (British Petroleum (2005)), world commodity prices have 
accelerated upwards since 2000, particularly from 2002–2005, largely in response to rising demand and supply 
bottlenecks (Table 3). Oil and natural gas prices shot up, with oil prices per barrel rising from $25.0 to $53.0 
between 2002 and 2005. Prices for cotton, gold, and other minerals were also strong. Export earnings from 
these commodities, and the associated revenues ﬂowing into the government coffers gave CARS the ability 
to begin addressing social issues, develop and improve infrastructure, and increase economic efﬁciency (see 
Makhmutova, 2005). 
Table 3: International Prices for Oil, Cotton, and Gold ($ per unit)
Commodity 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Oil1 28.5 24.5 25.0 28.8 38.3 53.0
Cotton2 59.2 48 46.2 63.3 63.6 63.3
Gold3 279 271 310 363 421 375
1 $ per barrel; Brent crude 
2 US cents per pound
3 $ per troy ounce
Sources: Oxford Economic Forecasting, Economic Intelligence Unit, World Economic Outlook (International Monetary 
Fund), and authors’ estimates.
FDI Inﬂows
Average annual FDI inﬂows in the oil and gas exporting CARs doubled to $2.3 billion in Kazakhstan during 1997–
2004, $917.5 in Azerbaijan and $156.8 million in Turkmenistan (Table 4). FDI in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan rapidly 
approached those in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (see Simoneti et al, 2005). Oil, gas, and 
mining beneﬁted most from the FDI inﬂows, but the nascent manufacturing sector was also targeted. Substantial 
raw material deposits along with high international prices; favorable corporation tax rates for foreign investors; 
a strengthening of supply lines to export; improvements in the energy infrastructure; and low cost technical 
manpower attracted much of the investment (Moldasheva, 2002, World Bank, 2003; Sabonis-Helf, 2004). Also, 
macroeconomic stabilization and implementation of economic reforms also played a role in attracting FDI (see 
section below). FDI brought not only capital but access to ownership advantages of multinationals (e.g., market 
access, new technology, and management skills), vital for efﬁcient exploitation and export. Other CARs also saw 
an increase in FDI in the late-1990s but overall levels were lower than the oil and gas exporters. Aside from the 
lack of oil and gas deposits, there was policy uncertainty, lack of transparent investment procedures, inadequate 
transport linkages with major investor markets, and under-developed market institutions (Wall, 2003; Mogilevsky, 
2004; World Bank 2004).9
Table 4: Trends in Exports, FDI, and Remittances, 1990–2004 (in $ millions)
Average Annual Exports Average Annual FDI Average Annual Remittances
% % %
1990-96 1997-2004 change 1990-96 1997-2004 change 1990-96 1997-2004 change
Oil Exporters:
   Azerbaijan           801.3            2,200.6    174.6             478.7             917.5         91.7 
..
           118.5 
..
   Kazakhstan        6,521.2          11,579.6      77.6          1,050.5          2,263.4       115.5          74.7               68.9 
..
   Turkmenistan        2,085.5            2,386.6      14.4               89.1             156.8         76.1 
..
           105.7  41.4 
Non-oil 
Exporters:
   Kyrgyz Republic           434.9                665.4      53.0 
..
             27.9  ..           1.6               31.8  1,863.1
   Tajikistan           551.7                804.8      45.9               13.5               23.1         71.3               0               43.1 
   Uzbekistan        3,848.0            3,585.0      (6.8)              39.2             105.1       168.2               0 
0
Source: World Development Indicators Online, World Bank
Better Macroeconomic Management
Macroeconomic stability—helped by declining inﬂation—has improved. Inﬂation rates have fallen signiﬁcantly 
throughout  the  region  over  the  past  few  years  indicating  improved  macroeconomic  management. Average 
inﬂation for the CARs as a group declined from 20.4% to 6.9% between 1997 and 2001 and between 2002 and 
2004 (Table 5). In 2005, it fell somewhat to 6.3%. Greater price stability was partly the result of greater ﬁscal and 
monetary discipline as well as greater stability in exchange rates (IMF, 2005; Hausmann and Others, 2005). 












Azerbaijan -0.5 3.9 9.6 2.8 60.0
Kazakhstan 10.9 6.5 7.6 2.9 65.0
Turkmenistan 15.0 6.8 - 1.4 25.0
Non-oil Exporters
Kyrgyz Republic 19.1 3.0 4.4 3.0 75.0
Tajikistan 46.0 11.2 7.1 2.5 50.0
Uzbekistan 32.1 9.7 7.8 2.4 45.0
1This is a simple average of individual scores on the extent of reform in privatization, markets and trade, and ﬁnancial institutions. The 
average scores range from 1 to 4 where 1 represents no change from a rigid centrally-planned economy and 4 represents the standards 
of an industrial market economy. 
2EBRD staff estimates. 
Sources: ADB (2005a); ADB (2006); EBRD (2005).
Economic reforms were also implemented across the region, albeit at different levels. According to EBRD (2005), 
signiﬁcant progress toward a market economy was achieved by 2005 through economic reform in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Higher EBRD average transition 
indicator scores for these reform-minded economies compared with other CARs is one indication.11 The reform-
11 The widely cited EBRD Transition Indicator Score is based on the perceptions of its country economists. Pomfret (2003a) among 
others regards qualitative perception data about progress in reform as being less reliable than quantitative indicators (e.g. effective 
rates of protection). Given concerns about the quality and reliability of data in the CARs, however, this indicator offers a useful albeit 
impressionistic measure of reform progress. 10
minded CARs that applied small scale privatization as well as liberalization of prices, trade and foreign exchange 
systems have improved the most. Currently, the Kyrgyz Republic has the most open trade regime in the region 
and in 1998, joined the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the only CAR to do so.12 Kazakhstan is also reforming 
its trade regime and laws and is on its way toward joining WTO. Reform agendas still to be tackled in these CARs 
include large scale privatization, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and building a competition policy. 
Among the other CARs, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have made progress recently in price liberalization and small 
scale privatization. By contrast, Turkmenistan remains largely unreformed with little prospect of adopting market-
oriented reforms in the near future.13 Better macroeconomic management and economic reform have typically 
provided a more conductive environment for private sector development in the region. As expected, estimates 
of private sector shares in GDP in 2005 were higher in the reform-minded CARs (between 60–75%) relative to 
other CARs. 
Agricultural Upturn
Since the late 1990s, agriculture was a major driver of growth in the non-oil exporting CARs—particularly the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan (Figure 2). This derived from generally favorable weather conditions, high world 
prices for cotton and wheat, along with several agricultural reforms. Some productivity gains were also achieved 
in collective farms producing cotton and wheat. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s wide ranging agricultural reforms emphasized collective farm privatization. An estimated 
70% of farm land is now privately owned (World Bank, 2005). Moreover, price and quantity controls were largely 
removed, public monopolies dismantled, and public investment in the rehabilitation of irrigation systems was 
increased. Uzbekistan, by contrast, undertook limited agricultural reform (Rumer, 2002; Rozelle and Swinnen, 
2004). In an attempt to improve food security, small garden plots to grow fruits and vegetables were granted to 
12 See Mogilevsky (2004) for details of the trade regime and the WTO accession process in the Kyrgyz Republic.
13 According to IMF (2004) and EBRD (2005), Turkmenistan has maintained an inward-oriented, state-controlled development strategy since 
independence with extensive central management over capital allocations, domestic prices, production, and foreign trade. Exploitation of 
extensive gas reserves—which have ﬁnanced prestige infrastructure projects (particularly Ashkhabad) and welfare —have enabled it to 
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Figure 2: Real Value-Added in Agriculture Index, 1990–2004 
(1990=100)11
14 In Turkmenistan, the share of industry in GDP remained constant at 44% during 1998-2001 according to World Bank World Development 
Indicators on-line. 
peasants in the early 1990s by Presidential Decree. By the late 1990s, privatization took the form of dismantling 
agricultural cooperatives (known as “shirkats”), distributing land leases to individual farmers, conditional on 
farmers using the land in accordance with state orders. State control remains pervasive in Uzbekistan for 
agricultural purchasing, pricing, subsidies, distribution, and provision of inputs. 
Political Stability
Improved political stability in the late-1990s was also a signiﬁcant factor contributing to the region’s economic 
revival. The most notable developments were (i) the ending of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1997 and (ii) the 
1994 signing of a ceaseﬁre resolving the conﬂict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Tajikistan is remarkable 
among post-conﬂict economies for its speed in forming a functioning government, its focus on implementing 
an economic development agenda and in seeking aid from multilateral institutions (World Bank, 2005). The 
ceaseﬁre enabled Azerbaijan to reduce defense expenditures, invest in infrastructure, and concentrate more on 
attracting FDI into oil and gas. The ceaseﬁre, booming oil and gas industry, and a high growth environment also 
stimulated domestic investment in industries closely linked to oil and gas. 
Other Features of the Revival
Structural Change
Central Asia’s revival has been driven by structural changes that have shifted production away from agriculture 
toward industrial goods and minerals. This shift was obvious in the oil and gas-exporting CARs. Between 1998 
and 2004, industry’s share of GDP rose from 36% to 54% in Azerbaijan and from 31% to 39% in Kazakhstan 
(Table 6).14 While oil and gas continue to drive the industrial sector in these economies, manufacturing has also 
grown. And manufacturing growth in the CARs is closely linked to the emergence of manufactured exports, 
which grew at about 10% per annum for the region as a whole during 1998–2003. In 2003, the CARs aggregate 
manufactured exports reached $3.7 billion. Export growth from the oil-exporting CARs was averaged about 
11% per year (see Table 4). For non-oil exporting countries, export performance was more modest but has 
accelerated since 2001. The largest economies—Kazakhstan ($2.1 billion) and Uzbekistan ($785 million)—were 
the region’s largest manufacturing exporters. 12
Table 6: Industry and Manufactured Exports in the CARs
Country
Share of








Major Manufactured Exports 
(% of total)
1998 2004 1998–2003 2003 2003
Oil Exporters
Azerbaijan 36 54 11.2% 134.4 Machinery (21%), 
Chemicals (38%), 
Iron & Steel (20%)
Kazakhstan 31 39 10.1% 2,117.0 Iron & Steel (70%)
Turkmenistan 44 442 23.0% 225.0 Textiles & Garments (83%)
Non-oil Exporters
Kyrgyz Republic 23 233 5.4% 193.1 Textiles & Garments (37%)
Tajikistan 22 21 7.4% 250.1 Textiles & Garments (92%)
Uzbekistan 26 22 8.5% 785.0 n.a.
Total CARs 9.9% 3,705.0
n.a. = not available
1 2001
22003
3 Industry comprises mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities..
Sources: Author’s estimates based on data from International Monetary Fund; National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic; and  
World Development Indicators Online (World Bank).
The structure of manufactured exports varies from country to country. Some CARs have specialized in labor-
intensive activities while others have moved toward more capital and technology-intensive activities (Wignaraja, 
2005).  Textiles  and  garments,  for  example,  account  for  80%  of  manufactured  exports  in  Tajikistan  and 
Turkmenistan, and 37% in the Kyrgyz Republic. While a detailed breakdown of Uzbekistan’s manufactured 
exports is unavailable, they are thought be largely in textiles and transport.15 In Kazakhstan’s, 70% of its large 
manufactured export base consists of iron and steel products, with the rest chemicals, plastics and machinery. 
Azerbaijan’s much smaller export base is a mix of iron and steel, chemicals, and machinery. 
Concentrating on one or two exports is inevitable in the early stages of an export-led manufacturing growth—as 
in the CARs. This is particularly true when suddenly thrust into international markets with little experience and 
logistics from being land-locked. Still, export concentration means greater vulnerability to internal or external 
shocks that affect speciﬁc industries. This is now recognized within the region. Kazakhstan in particular is trying 
to foster economic diversiﬁcation away from extractive raw materials using an Innovative Industrial Development 
Strategy (IIDS) 2003–2015, which was introduced in 2003 (see GOK, 2003). The program will complement existing 
economic reforms rather than supplement them. IIDS emphasizes the creation of priority industrial clusters and 
supports investment institutions, industrial credit, and innovation.16 IIDS remains in its ﬁrst phase— involving 
diagnostic studies, training, and institution-building—so it is still too early to assess its impact on Kazakhstan’s 
eventual export performance. 
Natural resource availability, lower transport costs, incentive policies, and initial conditions are some factors 
responsible for the improved manufactured export performance and the pattern of product specialization in 
15As Wall (2003) notes: “Most of Uzbekistan’s export trade take place under state trading arrangements. Trade data being a state secret 
in Uzbekistan, it is not possible to carry out any serious analysis of export policy, but such aggregate data as are available show that 
in 2002 cotton ﬁber, energy and gold accounted for 70% of total ofﬁcial exports… All export data is though to be highly unreliable”, (pp. 
32–33).
16Detailed studies undertaken by the Center for Marketing and Analytical Research of Kazakhstan have identiﬁed seven priority 
industrial clusters: tourism, oil and gas engineering, food, textile, logistics services, metallurgy, and construction materials.13
the region since the late 1990s (Gormart, 2003a; Freinkman et. al. 2004; World Bank, 2004; Wignaraja, 2005). 
Some  common  explanations  underlie  the  record  of  reform-minded  CARs.  For  example,  the  emergence  of 
textiles and garments as major exports in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan is associated with availability of 
inexpensive cotton, new foreign investment, relatively inexpensive yet skilled labor, and the implementation of 
market-oriented reforms. Growth in iron, steel, and chemical exports from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reﬂect the 
abundance of iron ore and crude reserves, FDI, improvements in macroeconomic management, ample supplies 
high-tech manpower, and signiﬁcant infrastructure investments. New investments rehabilitated existing capacity 
and created new production facilities. 
Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan, have largely followed inward-oriented economic policies 
inherited from the former Soviet Union, with export growth linked to raw material availability and some special 
circumstances. Uzbekistan’s textile exports mainly derive from domestic ﬁrms which have the advantages of 
cheap cotton, low labor costs, a protected domestic market, and the demand and proximity to regional markets. 
Turkmenistan attracted export-oriented foreign investment in textiles and garments from Turkey through by way 
of their close historical ties, inexpensive cotton, and the highly-subsidized power driving production. 
Poverty Reduction 
After generally increasing from 1990 to 1997, poverty levels have slowly dropped in the years since (Table 7). 
Based on ADB and World Bank estimates over the past six years, poverty incidence was between 28% and 
30% in oil-exporting Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and in Uzbekistan. In Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Tajikistan estimates of poverty incidence were nearly twice as high, ranging from 48% to 57%. For the region as 
a whole, poverty incidence averages 40%. 
Table 7: Poverty Estimates
National Poverty Incidence 
(population below poverty line, %)
Early Period Recent Period
Oil Exporters
Azerbaijan 68.1 (1995) 49.6 (2001)
Kazakhstan 34.6 (1996) 27.9 (2002)
Turkmenistan ... 29.9 (1998)
Non-oil 
Exporters
Kyrgyz Republic 51.0 (1997) 47.6 (2001)
Tajikistan ... 56.6 (2003)
Uzbekistan ... 27.5 (2000)
CARs 39.9
Sources: ADB (2004a), World Bank (2005b).
... = not available.
Lower inﬂation rates, stronger growth, creation of new external trade links, and the restoration of social and 
political stability contributed to the decline in poverty in the CARs.17 In addition, remittance income from unskilled 
and semi-skilled overseas workers in Turkey, Russia, and Kazakhstan has become an important source of income 
for the poorer segments of society in the non-oil exporting CARS. There has also been a trickle down effect 
17 See Gormart (2003b), World Bank (2005c), and Dowling and Wignaraja (2005).14
from labor intensive industries—such as garments—newly developed within the region. For social development, 
foreign aid has also contributed to poverty reduction, particularly in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.
Rural poverty remains a signiﬁcant problem in some CARs as many urban unemployed move to rural areas 
looking for work, but ﬁnd few opportunities on state farms. Income disparities and poverty are more pronounced 
in certain subregions—for example, the Ferghana Valley and border regions of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
and Tajikistan). Still, despite some regional inequalities, overall income distribution is reasonably equitable with 
an average Gini coefﬁcient of 33.2%. 
In terms of Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s), the CARs have made some progress, but there is agenda 
long way to go, with concern that Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan will not make the 2015 deadline. In fact, 
the distance to achieving some targets appears to be lengthening. There is evidence of high, increasing rates of 
malnutrition in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Education standards have also slipped and the effects of the collapse 
in the social sector in some CARs deteriorated health. The second Asian regional report on MDGs—A Future 
Within Reach: Reshaping Institutions in a Region of Disparities to Meet the Millennium Development Goals 
in Asia and the Paciﬁc (ADB, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc (UNESCAP), September 2005)—calls for a reshaping 
of national and local institutions involved in the delivery of services to help achieve the MDGs. Key issues include 
improving the provision and quality services, reducing barriers to access services, and broadening the range of 
providers. The report also analyzes how regional cooperation and trends toward economic integration can help 
speed the development process.
Policy Trends 
Type I and Type II policies were important in enabling the CARs to begin returning GDP to pre-1990 levels. 
This was particularly important in creating a more stable and attractive environment for FDI in Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, and to increase agricultural efﬁciency—and thus proﬁts—in the Kyrgyz Republic. Still, the main 
impetus for the revival since the late 1990s was higher commodity prices for oil and gas, cotton, gold, and 
metals, along with the restoration of political stability in some CARs. The People’s Republic of China’s rapid 
economic growth and inelastic global demand for these commodities helped this bullish external environment 
for the CARs. 
Type  III  policies  were  relatively  unused  since  1990  as  only  Kazakhstan  has  recently  started  to  introduce 
industrial  competitiveness  policies  through  its  Innovative  Industrial  Strategy,  2003–2015  (see  GOK,  2003). 
Although Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are studying their own industrial competitiveness, they have yet to design 
or implement relevant market-friendly policies. To varying degrees, CARS participate in the various regional 
initiatives to address the constraints of being small, land-locked economies. These include the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), Eurasia Economic Community (EuRASEC), Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, 
Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC), and the Single Economic Space and the Special Program for 
the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA). Most have differing and sometimes conﬂicting objectives and overlap 
country coverage.18 Because of this, these initiatives have had limited impact thus far in harmonizing regional 
objectives in the key areas of trade, energy, and transportation (see Pomfret, 2003b).19 Table 8 describes the 
relative level of implementation.
18 See UNDP (2005) and aric.adb.org for details.
19 The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) was initiated in 1997 to improve living standards and reduce poverty 
in CAREC countries through more effective regional cooperation. To date, the CAREC progam has focused on ﬁnancing infrastructure 
projects and improving the regional policy environment in the areas of transport, energy, trade policy and trade facilitation. The countries 
covered include the CARs as well as Afghanistan, PRC and Mongolia.  Futhermore, the CAREC Program is underpinned by alliance of 
multilateral institutions (ADB, IMF, World Bank and EBRD) with ADB serving as the CAREC secretariat. 15
Table 8: Implementation of Policy Typology1
Type I & II Type III




Azerbaijan High Low  Medium
Kazakhstan High Medium Medium
Turkmenistan Low Low Low
Non-oil Exporters
Kyrgyz Republic High Low High
Tajikistan Medium Low High
Uzbekistan Medium Low Low
1 High = strong implementation.
Source: Author’s estimates
Recent proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the region has added an additional layer of 
complexity (Table 8). In 1995, there were three ADB developing member country FTAs (two bilateral and one 
cross-regional) notiﬁed to the WTO. By March 2006, there were 18, with another 21 FTAs already signed or 
being implemented but which had not yet been registered with the WTO. Each CAR now has at least one FTA in 
place with each other and some have several overlapping accords. The drive toward political alliances, foreign 
investment, and market access for small land-locked economies seem to be the main drivers of FTAs in the 
region. However, the proliferation of a large number of bilateral arrangements can lead to the “spaghetti bowl” 
effect—a term popularized by Bhagwati (2002). There can be harmful effects caused by multiple rules of origin 
arising from overlapping agreements among signatories of FTAs. Complex rules of origin increase administrative 
and business costs, particularly for SMEs which have limited capacity to absorb them.20 Also, if they have large 
transactions costs, these rules can deter foreign investment and trade. Thus, an economic case can be made for 
streamlining rules of origin and other procedures that affect business in the CARs by consolidating overlapping 
bilateral FTAs. The goal could be a region wide FTA with relatively low trade barriers compared with the rest of 
the world, adopting standards and trade rules compatible with WTO agreements.
 
20 No estimates are available of the costs associated with rules of origin for FTAs in Central Asia. A recent literature survey by Tapp (2005) 
indicates that administrative costs to enterprises pertaining to rules of origin from the EU are in the range of 3% to 5% of the value of 
exports while that for NAFTA is less than 2%. 16
Table 9: FTAs/FAs in Central Asia (as of March 2006)
A.  Summary of WTO Status
  WTO Notiﬁed Not Notiﬁed Total
Total  18 21 39
Central Asia only 5 7 12
Cross-regional 13 14 27
Central Asia and others 12 13 25
Multi-Regional 1 1 2
B.  Individual FTAs in Central Asia
Agreements Date Status WTO Notiﬁcation
Central Asia 1 ( Central Asia 7)
Tajikistan-Armenia FTA 1994 FTA signed
Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan FTA 1996 FTA signed
Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan FTA 1996 FTA signed
Tajikistan-Kyrgyz FTA 1996 FTA signed
Tajikistan-Uzbekistan FTA 1996 FTA signed
Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan FTA 1997 FTA signed
Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan FTA 1997 FTA signed
Armenia-Kyrgyz FTA 1995 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kyrgyz-Kazakhstan FTA 1995 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Armenia-Turkmenistan FTA 1996 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kyrgyz-Uzbekistan FTA 1996 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Armenia-Kazakhstan FTA 2001 FTA Under Implementation Yes
 
Cross-regional
Pakistan-Kazakhstan PTA 2003 PTA proposed
Pakistan -Tajikistan PTA 2004 PTA proposed
Azerbaijan-Russia FTA 1992 FTA signed
Uzbekistan-Russia FTA 1992 FTA signed
CIS FTA 1 1994 FTA signed Yes
Tajikistan-Russia FTA 1994 FTA signed
Azerbaijan-Moldova FTA 1995 FTA signed
Azerbaijan-Ukraine FTA 1995 FTA signed
Uzbekistan-Georgia FTA 1995 FTA signed
Uzbekistan-Moldova FTA 1995 FTA signed
Tajikistan-Belarus FTA 1998 FTA signed
Tajikistan-Ukraine FTA 2001 FTA signed
GUAM FTA 2 2002 FTA signed
Common Economic Space 3 2003 FTA  signed
Armenia-Russia FTA 1992 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kyrgyz-Russia FTA 1993 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Armenia-Moldova FTA 1995 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Armenia-Ukraine FTA 1996 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Azerbaijan-Georgia FTA 1996 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kyrgyz-Moldova FTA 1996 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Armenia-Georgia FTA 1998 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kyrgyz-Ukraine FTA 1998 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Kazakhstan-Georgia  FTA 1999 FTA Under Implementation Yes
Turkmenistan-Georgia  FTA 2000 FTA under implementation Yes
EurAsEC Customs Union 4 2001 FTA Under Implementation Yes
  
Multi-regional
SCO FTA 5 2003 FTA Proposed
ECOTA  2003 FTA Signed Yes
1Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
2Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine
3Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine
4Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic. Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
5PRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia
Source: ADB Free Trade Agreement Database, released 27 March 2006.17
Two recent studies shed light on the gains from adopting Type III policies in Central Asia. First, using a general 
equilibrium approach, the UNDP Human Development Report for Central Asia (UNDP, 2005) concludes that the 
region’s GDP could be 50–100% higher in 10 years following a comprehensive program of regional cooperation 
and integration.21 This program would include reduction in trade costs through more efﬁcient transit, better 
coordination of water use and ﬂood control, more efﬁcient energy pricing and management, and cooperation in 
education and knowledge sharing. UNDP suggests that the cumulative gains would be even higher if this highly 
dynamic regional economy becomes fully integrated with its neighbors and the world economy. It also indicates 
that smaller and poor economies of the region—the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan—would beneﬁt even more. 
“The beneﬁts from regional cooperation are likely to be distributed in a way that on average helps the poor more 
than the better off, according to the report.” (p. 207). 
In the second study, using a scenario planning approach, per capita incomes in the region could double by 2015 
and poverty could halve if the region adopted policies for economic reforms, regional cooperation, and industrial 
competitiveness (Dowling and Wignaraja, 2006). Policy reforms would include acceleration in privatization, 
better corporate governance, ﬁnancial sector liberalization, and export promotion. Regional cooperation would 
include an integrated road and rail network, streamlining customs codes and border procedures, and developing 
a regional energy market and infrastructure. Industrial competitiveness policies would promote diversiﬁcation, 
link enterprises into global value chains, upgrade supplier development, restructuring technology institutions, 
and fostering partnerships between government and the private sector. 
V. Assessment and Conclusions
The CARs experienced a decline in output equivalent to that of the United States Great Depression. With limited 
policy reform and the economic downturn that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union, some observers were 
ready to write off the CARS as hopeless cases. Isolated geographically, suffering severe disruptions and a 
breakdown in traditional market structures, and facing a lack of alternative trade and supply opportunities, it 
may be easy to understand the early hopelessness. As isolated, landlocked provinces within a large centrally-
planned economy, the CARs after independence had to deal with a huge gap in capacity and lack of experience 
in governance, both in the public and private sectors (particularly as many Russian managers and expatriates 
returned home). This predicament can not be overemphasized when assessing the CARs performance since 
1990. 
The CARs slowly began to cope with this myriad assortment of problems (see Starr, 2004). And the evidence 
accumulated since the transition recession bottomed out in the mid-1990s suggests that, quite to the contrary, 
economic revival is underway. While the oil exporting countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan 
show more robust economic activity, the non-oil exporters of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are 
also growing more rapidly. Structural change, particularly the expansion of the manufacturing sector, along with 
poverty reduction, has accompanied the accelerated growth in the region. 
This experience highlights both the importance of the speed of reform and the nature of the policy mix—based 
on initial conditions—to build a successful transition. The evidence further casts doubt on whether the Type I 
big bang approach to economic transition is appropriate in light of local conditions (see Newbery, 1991; Rana 
and Dowling, 1993; Rana, 1995). Generally, the approach had limited impact in 1990-1996 in the CARs. There 
were disruptions in trade and production with other members of the former Soviet Union, migration of skilled 
personnel, political instability, loss of investment conﬁdence, and isolation from external markets. With this 
backdrop, local entrepreneurs were unable to disentangle reform incentives from innate volatility, which also 
contributed to a lack of foreign investor conﬁdence with the exception of the mineral sector (where the rents 
remained high). Furthermore, policies adopted did not address the preconditions for growth—efﬁcient and well-
functioning markets for goods, services, and factors of production. Nor did they deal with the critical issue of 
reforming and upgrading institutions from the Soviet era, whether the legal system, bureaucratic procedures, and 
the technical education and capacity building required in a market economy. 18
The route Turkmenistan took suggests that a complete lack of reform is not a viable option in the long-term 
if developing a competitive market economy is the goal (the revival in growth since 1998 was a direct result 
of higher gas and cotton prices, Turkmenistan’s primary exports). Excessive state interference or domestic 
distortions from the inward, Soviet-style economic policies hinder private sector activity and market development, 
with the exception of the energy sector. Rural poverty will also likely persist without the agricultural reforms or 
social investments in health and education. 
For Uzbekistan—the only CAR that followed a gradual policy adjustment strategy—there was a smaller output 
decline than the more reformist CARs.22 This gradual approach to policy reform shows the importance of keeping 
some continuity of institutions during transition. Recent performance, however, indicates that now is the time to 
move on.. Inward-orientation, import substitution, and excessive state intervention from the Soviet era have run 
their course. The economy may be primed for new economic policies aimed at boosting the private sector in 
developing a market economy. 
With higher commodity prices (particularly oil and gas), an upturn in agriculture, and better implementation 
of Type I and Type II policies, local and foreign investors  can see the incentives effects from the mid-1990s, 
particularly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. As a result, FDI increased with domestic investment following suit. 
These factors drove the rapid acceleration in growth since 1998. Structural change, manufactured exports, and 
poverty reduction accompanied this growth. 
The Kyrgyz Republic is the economy reputed to be the best reformer in Central Asia. However, after some minor 
gains, it has been characterized by a marked lack of foreign investment, domestic manufacturing competitiveness, 
and high economic growth. This suggests that further policy measures are needed to accelerate growth in this 
small, resource-poor, landlocked economy. 
Short-term, prospects for the CARs are optimistic. Through 2008, international ﬁnancial institutions project annual 
economic growth in Central Asia to be close to 10% (ADB, 2006 and IMF, 2005). Although inﬂation is expected 
to rise somewhat, growth among oil exporters will continue to be propelled by a combination of high world oil and 
gas prices, buoyant international energy demand, continued inﬂows of FDI, and larger investments in modern 
infrastructure. For the non-oil exporters, growth will be somewhat slower. A lot will depend on favorable non-oil 
export commodity prices (e.g. cotton, gold, aluminum, and other metals) to aid in ﬁnancing expansion in the 
services sector, and the cost of implementing economic reforms. 
The gains from better allocation of existing resources, however, could slow as the revival continues. To sustain 
future growth, Type III policies to increase industrial competitiveness and regional cooperation need to be 
added to the policy mix. These include measures to accumulate higher levels of technology and capacity at the 
corporate level, vital to boosting industrial competitiveness. Market expansion through regional cooperation to 
realize economies of scale should be paramount. Also, the interaction of FDI inﬂows within the context of regional 
cooperation will enhance the ability of the CARs to reap the beneﬁts of a dynamic comparative advantage for 
individual countries and the region as a whole..
In this paper, we show that initial conditions and policies are critical to economic success during transition. Relying 
on a “one-size-ﬁts-all” approach that emphasizes rapid reform has brought limited gains in the small, land-locked 
transition economies of Central Asia. Without the recent boom in commodity prices and continued resource 
exploitation, the region might have witnessed a much more prolonged period of economic stagnation. To sustain 
growth during transition, the case was made for a more gradual and more comprehensive approach that includes 
policy reform, regional cooperation, and industrial competitiveness. Implementing a more comprehensive policy 
agenda requires political stability and good governance, a strong commitment to a nationally agreed policy 
agenda, and investment in capacity building for economic policy management in an open economy (Dowling 
and Valenzuela, 2004). 
22 Others have referred to the relatively limited output decline in Uzbekistan during the early 1990s amidst cautious economic reform as the 
“Uzbek puzzle”. Loukoianova and Unigovskaya (2004) suggest that Uzbekistan’s economic performance may have been overestimated 
and that its ofﬁcial GDP data are less accurate than those of the other CIS countries. Meanwhile, Zettelmeyer (1998) argues that 
Uzbekistan’s output drop was cushioned by a low initial industrialization, its cotton production which could be readily sold on international 
markets and its self-sufﬁciency in energy.19
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